As I tolde you before, my libertie, which I loue
better than my selfe; for though I loue inconstancie
as my selfe, and had as leeue not be, as not be vn-
constant; yet can I not but hate that which I loue;
but when I am enforced vnto it: and (by your leaue)
as daintie as you make of the matter, I am perswa-
ded that you would euen hate your selfe, if you
were but wedded vnto your selfe.
Selfeloue is not the loue that we talke of, but ra-
ther the kinde of knitting of two harts in one, of
which sort if you had a faithfull louer, what shoulde
you loose by being faithfull vnto him?
More than you shall get by being so.
I seeke nothing but him to whom I am constant.
And euen him shall you loose by being constant.
What reason haue you for that?
No other reason than that which is drawn from
the common places of loue, which is for the most
part, reason beyond reason.
You may rather call it reason without reason; if
they conclude that loue and faith, the more they
haue, the lesse they shall finde.
Will you beleeue your owne experience?
Farre beyond your reason.
Haue you not then found amongst your louers,
that they would flie you, if you do but follow them,
and follow you most, when you do most flie them?
I graunt I haue found it too true in some, but I
now speake of a constant louer indeed.
You may better speake of him than finde him;
but the onely way to haue him, is, to be vnconstant.
I haue heard Philosophers say, that Inquisito ter-
mino cessat motus, there is no motion (and you know
loue is a motion) + but it ceaseth (or rather dieth)
when it hath gotten his end; and to say the truth,
loue hath no edge when it is assured, whose verie